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ABSTRACT 
This article argues that present-day procedures on public accountability miss the 
essence of being accountable. We suggest that alternatives are available in 
social psychology theory and network theory, which point to the decisive role of 
peers or experienced organization members. In this view, it is not leadership but 
middle management that is crucial in the socialization of newcomers in an 
organization to internalize values and to create a situation in which employers 
and employees develop mutual expectations about what is expected from one 
another and create multiplex networks in order to maintain such values. 
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1 Introduction 
Public accountability is becoming increasingly important. In older times, 
accountability only came up when grave situations, i.e. disasters, 
occurred. Accountability involved control and answerability, often related 
to sanctions that had personal consequences aimed at righting wrongs. 
Recently, the practice changed into what some call "new" or "managerial 
accountability". This new kind of accountability emphasizes information-
exchange, behavior and performance explanation, trust, and horizontal 
relations between the account-holder and the accountee (cf. De Vries, 
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2007). It is based on the idea that everyone is essentially accountable to 
everyone and all must be able to justify their actions. 
This new form of accountability evolved in the last decades of the 20th 
century and the first decade of the new millennium. It addresses the 
responsibility and trustworthiness of officials and agencies, ways to 
minimize abuse of power and authority, and strategies and sanctions to 
ensure that those in authority comply with acceptable standards (Ayeni, 
2004). A major idea behind what is now called "public accountability" is 
that public bodies are accountable to the public, i.e. they should not 
waste the taxpayers’ money, they should be economical and efficient in 
achieving goals and they should be effective in the long run. In spite of 
these worthy goals, there are a number of negative side effects of this type 
of accountability. We mention five: 
The first problem relates to an increase in administrative costs. Since 
accountability has become more or less routine within the public sector as 
opposed to being event-related or trigger-induced, the number of reports 
under the heading of accountability has increased rapidly. Within the 
framework of public accountability, governments are often required to 
include a mandatory evaluation in their new laws and regulations. All new 
policy should be monitored and evaluated within 2–3 years of 
implementation. Furthermore, central government often demands periodic 
information from its governmental agencies and private business, 
regarding safety, environment, labor, et cetera (Power, 1997; Bowerman 
et al., 2000). Although this is fairly standard practice, the costs involved 
are substantial. As Olson, et al., write: »Information is not a free good. 
Collecting data, structuring data and reporting information consumes time 
and costs money« (Olson et al., 2001, p. 511; Boyne, 1998; Kirkpatrick, 
1999). 
The second problem is that the information gleaned from the 
accountability practices is rarely used. The administrative costs would be 
acceptable if public decisions were based on the information that the 
accountability measures provided. In reality, however, the reports are 
rarely discussed or debated and they seldom serve as the source for new 
public policies. 
This is related to the third problem, namely the positive bias in such 
reports with regard to what has been achieved and what the agency wants 
to achieve. This bias should cause us to question whether such accounts 
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are really as informative as they could be. As Olson, et al., tell us, »The 
rise of 'self-audits' (under traditional auditing concepts of independence, a 
blatant contradiction in terms) is a classic illustration of the increased 
importance and trust placed in processes of formal accountability« (Olson, 
et al., 2001, p. 510). The lack of control and consequences in present-
day accountability processes provides ample opportunity for the agency 
conducting the self-audit to present what is in its own interest regardless of 
whether it is an accurate or complete picture of what really is going on 
(Olson et al., 2001). 
The fourth problem of the modern approach to accountability is that when 
something goes wrong, a disaster happens or fraud is detected, it is often 
unclear who is responsible and that one has to refrain from sanctions, 
because it is unclear who is to be accused. If every public agency is 
accountable to every other public agency, it becomes difficult to 
determine which agency should have taken action to prevent the disaster. 
The complexities of collaborative government, the implementation of 
privatization, and the creation of semi-independent agencies, quangos 
and the like, have made it difficult to point directly at an individual actor 
as the responsible party. Instead, everyone points to everyone else – 
others who were similarly informed and gave their consent. The recent 
British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is a good example of a 
situation where everybody was involved, yet no one could be found guilty. 
The fifth problem – also seen in the oil spill – is that public accountability 
often comes at the expense of individual responsibility. If something is 
simply accounted for, i.e. shown to be within the laws and regulations, it is 
viewed as allowable – regardless of one’s own responsibility, values and 
norms. This is detrimental for public service motivation, and especially 
norm-based and affection-based motives that fuel the desire of public 
employees to serve the public interest and help others. Instead, the 
organization is left with individuals who are mainly rationally motivated 
and grounded in individual utility maximization, (Perry, 1996; Brewer, 
2000). 
This last problem is the main issue addressed in this paper. How can we 
incorporate and maintain norm-based and affective motives in public 
organizations? Our main response is that we need to exchange our focus 
on leadership with increased focus on the role of colleagues, especially 
the more experienced organizational members. We believe it is important 
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that first, the more experienced cadre of individuals handle the 
socialization of newcomers, and second, that they create dense networks 
that build trust among coworkers by creating interrelationships, 
information-exchanges, connectivity and especially multiplexity. 
Scholars frequently point to the crucial role of leadership and the 
importance of proper hierarchical coordination in order to change the 
minds of the people working in the organization (Sobis, De Vries & van 
den Berg, 2012). Although exemplary behavior at the top of the 
organization might have some impact on the behavior of personnel on the 
work floor, we argue that peers’ behavior is much more important. In our 
opinion, the importance of leadership is overrated. The exemplary nature 
of leadership often fails because of the distance between leadership and 
people on the work floor. Most of what leaders do is invisible to 
employees and/or susceptible to misinterpretation; direct relations 
between leaders at the top of the organization and individual workers are 
often minimal or even absent. It seems to make more sense to focus on 
the influence of peers, i.e. middle management, or experienced 
organization members on individual employees because the frequency 
and intensity of their relations is usually greater and therefore might be 
more influential. 
It is for this reason that the authors have sought out theories in different 
scholarly disciplines related to Public Administration that result in practical 
recommendations about how experienced organization members can 
motivate their colleagues to do what they are expected to do – which is 
the essence of public accountability – without hierarchical steering or 
continuous monitoring and evaluation. 
The answer suggested by an increasing number of scholars in Human 
Resource Management is that this is best accomplished by propagating 
commitment and compassion – emphasizing affective motivation, two 
aspects of work that are underrated in management practices that 
emphasize routines and values skills and outputs. 
In the next section, we discuss the importance of addressing these basic 
aspects of work. Highlighting their importance is a first step in creating a 
responsible organization. An important question at this point is, »How do 
we go about changing an organization into one that values commitment 
and compassion?« Answers to this question are provided by social-
psychological theories and network theories. Section 3 gives a brief 
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account of these two theories and their implications for our issue. We 
want to emphasize that although these theories provide answers, we do 
not yet believe they are the final answers. The two theories provide an 
idea or starting point for the research question underlying this article, 
namely, how to make public accountability work in such a way that it 
enhances responsibility among the stakeholders. In the conclusion, we 
discuss other theories that might be interesting in this regard. 
2 The neglect of emotion 
The most important deficiency in present-day performance measurement 
is the obvious neglect of those aspects of work that cannot be easily 
measured but often matter most, i.e. the inability of performance 
measures to measure what is relevant. In management and organization 
theory, it is becoming increasingly acknowledged that performance 
measurement has a bias towards measuring skills and measurable output 
indicated by knowledge, productivity, quality, initiative, allocation of time, 
planning, and development. It marginalizes the emotional aspects 
involved in public service such as courtesy, credibility, motivation, tact, 
patience, reassurance, empathy, understanding, persuasion, consultation, 
caring, commitment to the welfare of the client and the importance of the 
program, coaching, guiding and comforting clients (Guy, Newman & 
Mastracci, 2008). As critics argue, the motivation in delivering services to 
the public goes beyond rational aspects and includes norm-based and 
affective motives (Knoke & Christine Wright-Isak, 1982). The dominant 
way of steering by hierarchy and collecting large amounts of information 
in order to increase rationality, only optimizes skills and maximizes 
efficiency. 
The trend towards rationalizing the workplace and excluding the 
emotional aspects is in itself nothing new; it was visible as early as the 
1920s when the efficient functioning of government was compared to a 
machine. Van Riper argued that from the start, public administration has 
moved in an increasingly instrumental and managerial direction, valuing 
the application of scientific methodology to the resolution of public issues 
and building an identity of neutral expertise (Guy, Newman & Mastracci, 
p. 44). Frost et al. (2005) also point to the fact that the desire to see 
organizations as purely rational and calculated systems has a long history 
in organizational studies (Frost et al., 2005, p. 2) The emphasis on 
scientific management and what has become known as Taylorism 
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provided a strong foundation for stripping away a focus on humanity in 
the workplace, a tendency that has continued with organizational scholars 
who demonstrate a greater concern for society’s economic ends rather 
than its social ones (Frost et al., 2005, p. 3). 
In recent decades, this has become more explicit, because of the 
dominance of the public choice paradigm and the emerging dominance 
of New Public Management [NPM] (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). 
The Public Choice paradigm is based on a model of human behavior in 
which people are assumed to be motivated primarily by self interest. 
According to this view, because self interest is at the root of human 
behavior, incentives, organizations, and institutions have been and must 
be designed to recognize and take advantage of such motivations 
(Perry & Wise, p. 367). NPM mainly promoted efficiency and furthered the 
dominance of technical skills while neglecting the intrinsic value of 
commitment to programs by officials (Downs, 1967), out of the conviction 
about its social importance (Perry & Wise), and what some called the 
patriotism of benevolence (Frederickson & Hart, 1985). 
In the last couple of years, a movement has emerged that argues that in 
everyday delivery of public services, emotions are found everywhere (Guy, 
Newman & Mastracci, 2008), and they should not be marginalized. In 
their book on »Emotional Labor«, Guy and Newman provide ample 
illustrations from prison wards, correctional officers, and criminal 
investigators to 911-call operators, and they point out the importance of 
being able to deal with, show and manage emotions in everyday work. 
Nowadays, this research field in which commitment, passion and 
compassion are addressed is booming. The 2010 slogan of the Academy 
of Management conference in Montreal was »Dare to Care« and on the 
internet, numerous and ever increasing number of websites can be found 
on this topic. The research into this topic is rapidly increasing, but it is 
especially increasing in business administration and much less in Public 
Administration. This is a shame because the topic is as important in public 
service delivery and public accountability. 
That emotions are also important in the public sector has been argued in 
research into the work of western advisors in Central and Eastern Europe 
during its transition (Sobis & de Vries, 2009). There, we argued that the 
classic values of professionalism, i.e. commitment, empathy, information 
accuracy, caring, building expertise, using interventions that best suit 
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the situation at hand (responsibility), and making recommendations only 
when they are based on sound problem diagnosis, are increasingly 
viewed as old-fashioned values that need to be replaced by more rational 
values. These rational values include the following: advice is detached 
and objective, advice is aimed at maintaining appearances and 
promoting financial gains for the advisor, the advisor’s credibility is based 
on his/her formal education, and his/her interventions are based on 
standard setting and prefixed goals. We demonstrated that advice based 
on this new, more rational conception of professionalism mostly falls flat 
(Sobis & de Vries, 2009). 
In other research, de Vries, (2010) argued that in the case of Dutch 
municipalities, no matter how rational the organizations were, the 
effectiveness of their policies suffered as a result of interpersonal conflicts 
– which are full of emotions. It was also argued that when continuous 
change and reorganizations of local administrations took place without 
considering the emotional aspects of work, there was an increase of 
interpersonal conflicts. Up to 45% of Dutch local elites mentioned this as 
the main problem their municipality faces, i.e. the existence of 
interpersonal conflicts within city hall. Those involved perceived such 
conflicts as the municipality’s main impediment to developing effective 
policies and service delivery. 
The outcomes of that research and many other investigations suggest that 
the neglect of emotions is detrimental to organizational development and 
effective service delivery. As Kahn wrote in 1998, compassion is an 
essential part of care-giving that is part of, not separate from, work 
interactions (Kahn, 1998, p. 43) and as Guy, Newman and Mastracci 
argue, it is a critical component of fully one-third of all occupations and 
fundamental to public service and public management practice (Guy, 
2008, p. 172). 
Frost et al., (Frost, 2005) identify »compassion as comprised of three 
interrelated elements: noticing another’s suffering, feeling empathy for the 
other’s pain, and responding to the suffering in some way … Noticing 
involves a process of becoming aware of another’s emotional state, and 
typically requires being open and attentive to emotional cues and to what 
is happening in one’s context … Compassion resembles empathy (Davis, 
1983), but goes beyond this to involve a response to suffering. 
Michiel S. de Vries, Iwona Sobis 
Public Accountability through Soft Steering 
48 Uprava, letnik X, 1/2012 
Responding indicates action in which one attempts to alleviate or 
overcome the other’s condition in some way.« 
The above suggests that responsible organizations need compassionate, 
caring people, but it does not tell us how to build such an organization. 
The question of how to develop organizations that value and incorporate 
attention for emotions is still unanswered. 
Some argue that compassion should be propagated by leaders since their 
actions can offer important symbolic endorsements of what is an 
appropriate or inappropriate feeling (Pfeffer, 1981). Others argue that it 
involves coordinating the processes in which people arrange 
interdependent actions in ways that will enable them to accomplish their 
goals (Weick, 1995). Without structures and systems in place to 
coordinate member responses, joint efforts to offer compassion may fail 
as good intentions dissipate for lack of means to turn efforts into tangible 
help (Frost, 2005). Still others argue that creating a compassionate 
organization involves more than just a new type of reorganization. There 
is a need to view salient organizational interdependencies as being 
inherent in an organization, to see the development of compassion as a 
dynamic process and to recognize the influence of feedback loops on the 
nature and direction of compassionate acts, which also need to be 
historically embedded. 
However, this is still rather vague and procedural, and it neglects the fact 
that there is typically some distance between leadership and employees on 
the work floor; that coordination is often only another word for identifying 
the problem instead of a substantive solution; and that creating historical 
embeddedness is a goal instead of an instrument to build a responsible 
organization. The suggestions do not tell us what must be done in practice 
to build organizations in which people do what they are expected to do 
because they are committed to their work, care about the welfare of the 
client and are committed to the importance of the program, coaching, 
guiding and comforting clients. 
Below we argue that two theories could be relevant for answering this 
question; social psychology, in which socialization is important, and 
network theory, in which the density or multiplexity of relations is believed 
to be crucial in shaping working conditions in this direction. Although our 
search for a more comprehensive answer is still ongoing, these two 
theories provide a good start for our investigation. 
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3 Social psychology theory 
One of the major tasks of social psychology is explaining how people’s 
values are influenced by other people in their social world (Kaplan, 2001, 
p. 2772). One of its theories argues the following: Values and norms are 
relatively stable, and individuals are only susceptible to changes in their 
values and norms at certain moments in life, for instance, when they enter 
a new situation. At those moments, people can be socialized; they can 
successfully enter a learning process in which they internalize values, 
norms, attitudes, social roles and statuses of the groups or organization to 
which they begin to belong (Mead, 1934/1976; Goslin, 1999; Gecas, 
2001). Especially important is that such socialization deals with the 
cognitive dissonance that is bound to occur. The values and norms that 
the individual already holds might not be a perfect with the values and 
norms central to the organization, and this cognitive dissonance could 
result either in indifference, apathy or stress. Simply giving a financial 
reward for conducting behavior that the employee actually deploys only 
increases the cognitive dissonance and thus the indifference or stress. 
Theories in social psychology suggest tools to avoid this and to alter the 
values of employees by changing their current cognitions. According to 
social psychology theory, socialization – especially by experienced 
organization members/colleagues – is believed to be advantageous. A 
well conducted peer socialization process provides new employees with 
criteria to assure them that when they face a certain situation that requires 
changing, adding or reevaluating their cognitions, they do so in the 
direction the mission of the task requires. Such socialization results in 
clarity and congruence between the mutual expectations of employers and 
employees and can even result in what is called in social psychology a 
psychological contract, that is clarity about »the actions employees believe 
are expected of them and what response they can expect in return from 
the employer« (Wellin, 2007, p. 27). 
3.1 About values and norms 
Margaret Mooney Marini (Marini, 2001) presented a consistent theory 
that distinguishes values and norms – two useful concepts that explain 
human behavior and help us understand the world in which we live. 
Values involve people’s »cognitive beliefs of approval or disapproval« (op. 
cit. p. 2828). A value is seen as »a belief about the desirability of a mode, 
means, or end of action« (op. cit. p. 2828) i.e., a value informs what is 
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perceived as a good or a bad behavior. A value can be seen as a 
particular type of motive that involves »a belief about desirability of an 
action that derives from evaluation of that action’s expected 
consequences in a situation« (op. cit. p. 2829). Regarding the concept of 
"norm", Marini explains that in many respects, a norm plays a role for 
individuals’ that is similar to a value. It is also an evaluative belief based 
on morality, aesthetics, and achievements. However, a value puts stress 
on the desirability of behavior, while »a norm is a belief about the 
acceptability of behavior« (op. cit. p. 2829). 
One of the major findings in Social Psychology is that values and attitudes 
are rather stable. A political regime can be changed from communism to 
capitalism, but this does not automatically imply that the individuals’ 
values alter the change of the regime (Rokeach, 1973). This implies that: 
(1) it is difficult to change values, and (2) if such a change of values is 
accomplished, it will probably be a lasting change. As social psychologists 
argue, there are only a few of periods of time that individuals are more 
open for value-change: in their early youth, when they enter high school, 
when they enter college, and when they begin their first job. It is at these 
moments that values, attitudes, and norms can be created and changed, 
through what social psychologists call a process of socialization i.e., 
through exposure to the opinions and actions of other members of society 
or the organization. 
3.2 Socialization 
Socialization can be seen as a learning process in which an individual 
internalizes values, norms, attitudes, social roles and statuses of the 
groups to which he/she started to belong. Socialization can also be seen 
as the formation of self. George Herbert Mead (Mead, 1934) identified 
the self as a reflexive phenomenon that develops through symbolic 
interaction by the use of language with significant others known also as 
"the generalized others". 
Primary socialization occurs mostly in the family. Successively, we observe 
secondary socializing agents appearing like play groups and work groups. 
They continue the process of socialization by rewards and punishments to 
induce proper norms for behaviors. Life is like wandering through different 
family constellations, schools, sport-clubs, recreational settings, political 
parties, religious organizations, voluntary associations, workplaces, trade 
unions, professional organizations, even different states or different 
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marriage relations etc. All these institutions or organizations are 
socialization-agents. Each time people come under new influences, their 
world changes and so might their values, norms and attitudes change (see 
e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Jennings, 1968; Goldsen, 1960). Therefore, 
socialization that occurs at the workplace during the first year when a new 
employee enters the organization is so important. Such socialization can 
accomplish the internalization of specific values, norms and attitudes to 
result in the new employee’s effectiveness, but also to secure their 
coherent and exemplary behavior. Such socialization should be conducted 
by middle management also known as "experienced organizational 
members". It plays a decisive role, because it enables new employees to 
become socialized in the "right culture", from the beginning (Tannenbaum, 
et al., 1992). They should receive response from experienced organizational 
members about their performance. 
As to the format of such socialization, the literature suggests that the 
sustainability of the acquired knowledge, skills and incorporated values, 
norms and attitudes varies due to tactics used when socializing (e.g., Van 
Maanen & Schein, 1979). Van Maanen and Schein distinguished between 
collective versus individual socialization, formal versus informal 
socialization, sequential versus random socialization, fixed versus variable 
socialization, serial versus disjunctive socialization, and investiture versus 
divestiture. Cable (1994) points to the importance of the sequential, 
formal, serial, and investiture nature of socialization understood as 
structured career progression and institutionalized training programs, as 
well as the provision of role models and support from experienced 
organizational members. 
3.3 The contents of socialization 
Social psychology points to the requirement that the contents of 
socialization are focused on dealing with cognitive imbalance and 
cognitive dissonance. Heider (Heider, 1946, 1958), the father of theory 
on cognitive balance, assumes that individuals strive for stable systems. 
Personal stability is achieved when the individuals I like, like the same 
people and things that I like. It emphasizes belonging to a group. It is 
relevant for explaining friendship, conformity, and people’s reactions to 
criticism. Heider predicted that actors try to alter a situation if they feel a 
cognitive imbalance. They simply strive for balance, and this balance is 
much more important for them than mere contentment. 
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Osgood and Tannenbaum (Osgood, 1957) argued something similar in 
their incongruity theory. People tend to avoid a cognitive imbalance by 
decreasing the importance of their original values. If a positive and 
negative object are linked, the tendency is toward neutrality i.e., 
indifference. Looking upon it from a public administrative perspective, 
imbalanced situations can explain increased bureaucratization, an 
emphasis on procedures, indifference and detachment. 
Festinger’s theory on cognitive dissonance from 1957 points out that 
dissonance occurs if two elements of knowledge are in such a relation that 
when only considering these elements the obverse of one element would 
follow from the other. Every person will try to reduce dissonance and to 
achieve consonance. It implies that people seek evidence to confirm their 
actions to make their actions congruent with their attitudes. People 
change preferences under the strain of dissonance. This theory poses a 
quite different light on incentives, the role of utility and its influence on 
behavior. According to this theory, reducing cognitive dissonance is much 
more important in explaining choices than maximizing utility. In the 
famous Festinger-Carlsmith experiment (Festinger, 1959), people disliking 
a task e.g., making a false testimony, were offered an incentive to do so. 
The experiments showed that the higher the incentive the less enjoyable 
the task was perceived. Thus, the reward for doing something one does 
not like to do cannot compensate for the "bad" behavior. Festinger’s 
theory explains the outcomes by the distance between the positively 
perceived reward and the negatively perceived task that makes people 
feel uncomfortable. The experiment was repeated many times by different 
social psychologists and is known as the reverse incentive experiment. 
According to Mead’s theory about self-perception (1934), one’s own 
behavior is seen as the product of social interaction. Every organization 
should therefore accomplish some kind of interaction among its 
employees to teach them how to respond to external and internal stimuli, 
how to evaluate themselves and handle the tasks in the expected way. The 
questions we should ask are; to what or to whom do employees refer to 
when judging their performance and how to induce them to use a proper 
reference-frame. Does it accord to plan? Does one follow procedures? 
Does one fill in all of the questions in the evaluation report? Does one 
accomplish the prescribed goals? 
Michiel S. de Vries, Iwona Sobis 
Public Accountability through Soft Steering 
   Uprava, letnik X, 1/2012 53 
This situation is similar to the findings coming from an alternative theory 
created by Bem (1972). In this theory about self-perception, it is supposed 
that people infer their attitudes from their behavior in the same way 
outsiders do. It asserts that we can only have that knowledge of our own 
behavior and its causation that another person can have, and that we 
therefore develop our attitudes by observing our own behavior and 
conclude what attitudes must have caused them. Hence, if we are forced 
to act in a particular way, our attitudes towards the work will change 
accordingly. Central is the question »what must my – this man’s – attitudes 
be if I am – he is – willing to behave in this fashion in this situation« (Bem, 
1972, p. 28). If I am behaving this way, my attitudes must be like this and 
hence, these are thus, my attitudes. 
3.4 The result of socialization 
The result of such socialization is a psychological contract; it is unlike the 
normal contract in which the duties, the pay, and all kind of legal 
arrangements are established. It »relates to our mind and therefore is 
intangible« (Wellin, 2007, p. 17). Argyris (1960) first used the term of 
psychological contract and defined it as the implicit understanding 
between a group of employees and their supervisor. He sketched the 
"psychological work contract" in exactly the way that we search for i.e., 
»the employee will maintain high production« and reduce oversight and 
control, while »the foreman guarantees and respects the norms of the 
employee informal culture« by allowing him/her to make a certain job, 
provide him/her with adequate wage and secure his/her job. 
Schein (Schein, 1965) later defined the psychological contract as the 
unwritten expectations operating at all times between every member of an 
organization and the various managers and others in that organization. 
While each employee has expectations about his/her salary or pay rate, 
working hours, benefits and privileges that go with a job, the organization 
also has its own expectations that e.g., the employees will enhance the 
image of the organization, will be loyal, will keep organizational secrets, 
and will do their best. 
More recently, Denise Rousseau (Rousseau, 1994, 1995), redefined the 
psychological contract as something that essentially exists in each 
individual’s head, as the »individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, 
regarding terms of an exchange agreement between individuals and their 
organization« (Rousseau, 1995, p. 9). Wellin perceives the psychological 
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contract as »the actions employees believe are expected of them and what 
response they expect in return from the employer« (Wellin, 2007, p. 27). 
As such, the psychological contract cannot be laid down on paper as 
some companies think or something to be agreed upon during the last 
phases of recruitment. In its original meaning, it is something that 
emerges from a socialization period. 
3.5 Lessons from socialization theory 
Social Psychology argues that in order to build an organization in which 
values and norms are internalized by its employees, the following are 
necessary: 
1. Socialize newcomers during the first year they enter the organization 
to shape their attitudes. Clear guidance that transfers the right 
values and professional attitude is indispensable; 
2. Expose them to situations in which cognitive imbalance, incongruity 
or dissonance is bound to occur and train them to adjust, add or 
reweigh their cognitions in accordance to the values of trustee-
professionalism; 
3. Recognize that the decisive role of experienced middle management 
is much more crucial than the role of leadership. Middle 
management will mainly guide new employee/new professionals 
and transfer the values and attitudes to the newcomers that is of 
great importance for the organization; 
4. Strive for an implicit mutual understanding of expectations – a 
psychological contract – which is not just a transactional contract 
about pay for performance, or an individualized employment 
contract, but the result of an extensive process of socialization that 
involves learning and adaptation process of cognitions by which 
mutual and apparently justified trust is created and oversight can be 
diminished accordingly. 
4 Network theory 
Notwithstanding the strength of the argument of socialization theory, one 
can dispute its claim that socialization has lasting value and does not 
require follow-up in order to retain the values and norms of the 
employees. It might well be that although values are relatively stable, they 
could fade after a couple of years. What can be done to prevent this? 
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Network theory, originally developed to understand inter-organizational 
relations, provides an answer to this. 
The first systematic studies about networks, networking and building 
coalitions in organization are from the late 1950s and 1960s (Evan, 
1966). This classical research described interactions among individuals 
across organization that aim to create networks for getting things done 
and exchanging information. These interactions often go beyond the 
formal structure of organization, and it is assumed that much more is 
accomplished than would be the case with only formal channels of 
organization. Creating a network is seen as a somewhat simple task; 
identify people who could be helpful in the process of trying to achieve 
expected objectives, establish their reliability, and then actively seek their 
cooperation. Literature on this subject shows that a similar function i.e., 
»getting things done in organization« is involved in creating alliances i.e., 
»getting agreement on a course of action with other people and joining 
forces to get things done« (Armstrong, 2006, p. 301). 
According to Evan (Evan, 1966), social science research up to that point 
was primarily concerned with networks as inter-organizational 
phenomena, and theory and methodology impeded research on inter-
organizational relations. To solve this problem, Evan suggested two 
methodological tools that could prove useful in the development of 
empirical research on inter-organizational relations i.e., graph theory and 
input-output analysis. The first one was developed as research dealing 
with network visualization, and the second one is known as transaction 
cost economics [TCE]. 
During 1980s and 1990s, scholars and practitioners described the 
growing interest in networks and multi-organizational relations that are 
usually created to solve complex problems – mainly occurring in the 
private sector but also in the public one. A network was defined as »the 
group of more or less independent organizations that have a relative 
stable and long-term cooperation« (Grandori & Soda, 1995). More 
recently, theorizing on inter-organizational networks has started to evolve. 
Recent theories are based on assumptions similar to individual networks: 
1. Actors (organizations) are influenced by the social contexts within 
which they are embedded, 
2. organizational fields serve as significant environments for their 
members, 
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3. the inter-organizational structures, and not the characteristics of a 
field, determine performance, and 
4. the relational structures of the field-net per se, as opposed to the 
position of the actors in the field, determine the performance of the 
actors involved and the performance of the network as a whole 
(Kenis & Knoke, 2002, p. 290). 
The solutions that network theory suggests address, among other things, 
the following problems: the prevention of opportunistic behavior and 
moral hazard, the reduction of transaction costs, the improvement of the 
performance of organizations within the network, and more recently, the 
performance of the network as a whole (Provan & Kenis, 2007). 
These theories attempt to explain the nature and consequences of specific 
types of relationships among actors, be it organizations or members within 
an organization and suggest solutions as alternatives for hierarchy, 
especially when the latter is failing. A major problem is the difficulty of 
recruiting critical stakeholders, maintaining active member involvement, 
promoting a collaborative work culture, and achieving collaborative 
outcomes (Foster Fishman, et al., 2001, p. 901). 
Such alternatives can be found in alliances, partnerships and networks. 
However, many other connotations also exist (Cropper, et al. 2008, pg. 
4–5; Van de Ven, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Oliver, 1990; Barringer & 
Harrison, 2000; Cropper et al., 2008). These theories assume that it is 
not the field of work or the position of actors in a network that explain its 
performance; instead, performance is determined by the structure of the 
network as a whole in terms of its density, its embeddedness, and its 
interaction patterns. Provan, Fish & Sydow conclude that »Only by 
examining the whole network can we understand such issues as how 
networks evolve, how they are governed, and ultimately, how collective 
outcomes might be generated. This last point is especially relevant to 
policy planners and those having a perspective that goes beyond the 
performance of individual organizations« (Provan, 2007, p. 3). 
According to this line of thinking, the varying performance of 
organizations inside a network or individuals inside an organization is 
based on the centrality, connectivity, density, and the multiplexity of their 
relations in the network as a whole. 
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Embeddedness is created by either dictating (establishing hierarchy) or 
communicating (establishing social bonds) or both. This relation is 
generated by intermediary factors such as trust, incentive structures, 
resource dependence, network density, centrality, clustering, and 
multiplexity in the relations. 
4.1 Assumptions and outcomes of research in networks 
The main assumptions and factors to consider when analyzing networks 
can be summarized in term of a network’s: 
1. Context; the assumption is that actors are influenced by the social 
contexts in which they are embedded. The contexts are 
characterized by varying complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, 
dynamics, and institutionalization. 
2. Developmental phase; the assumption is that the way that 
organizational fields serve as significant environments for their 
members is underlined by awareness and partner selection, and 
dependent on the degree to which the network has evolved, i.e., 
whether it is in the exploration, expansion, or commitment phase. 
3. Types of governance; the assumption is that the performance of 
actors depends less on the characteristics of the field of study than 
on the contextual structures, such as management, centrality, and 
resource dependency (Provan & Kenis, 2007). 
4. Structural features; the assumption is – the performance of the 
network as a whole is determined by the relational structures of the 
field-net per se, not by the positions of actors in a network (Kenis & 
Knoke, 2002, p. 290). Some researchers put emphasis on size, 
density, reciprocity, connectivity, multiplexity, cohesion, interlocks, 
goal-consensus, trust, legitimacy, formalization, transaction costs, 
information exchange, and social embeddedness (Zaheer et al., 
1998; Kenis & Knoke, 2002). 
It seems that the research on inter-organizational relations supports social 
psychological theory about socialization understood as »the process of 
interaction through which an individual (a novice) acquires the norms, 
values, beliefs, attitudes, and language characteristic of his or her group« 
(Gecas, 2001, p. 2855). From network theory, we can deduce that such 
beliefs, values, norms and attitudes can be maintained by the formal and 
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informal features of the governance structures. This will be described in 
the next section. 
The characteristics of the context of a network have diverse implications. 
Some studies find that various types of inter-organizational ties have 
different effects on performance and this, in turn, is contingent on the 
favorability of the markets (op cit Gulati & Higgins, 2000, p. 137). 
Discontinuities can cause problems of understanding, different 
interpretations of the same phenomena, ambiguity and framing. Especially 
in the early phases of network development, unfamiliarity among the 
members can cause serious problems. This is even more the case because 
a network develops an enacted context for each of the participants, and 
the context of this network is an additional layer restricting or enabling 
participants to act. The difficulties and adversities in the context of the 
network, which is itself a self-initiated context, mean that huge investments 
in mutual relations are necessary. Some researchers have examined 
»which conditions facilitate and constrain the formation of … networking 
relation« (Provan & Kenis, 2007). An in-depth study, conducted by Doz 
(1996), presents a model in which he shows »how specific initial 
conditions (task definition, partners’ routines, structure of the 
organizational interface, and actors’ expectations) facilitate or hamper 
partner learning (about the environment, tasks, process, skills, goals)« 
(Ebers, 2002, p. 8). If the environmental context does not value 
collaboration, it is difficult to establish inter-organizational relationships, 
and instead of cooperation, competition might be the result. 
As to the importance of the developmental phase of the network, Larsson 
(1992) identified three phases in networking relations: (1) a pre-working 
stage in which the preconditions for network are decided, (2) 
establishment of network relations, and (3) the commitment phase, in 
which the networking relations are solidified. Gray (Gray, 1987) writes 
about: (1) a problem-setting phase, in which potential partners identify 
their common interest, (2) a direction-setting phase, in which potential 
networking partners present their values to »develop a sense of common 
purpose«, and finally (3) a structuring phase, in which the partners build 
and develop stricter institutions by regulating mutual support towards their 
operative actions. Thus, the mentioned scholars identify the characteristic 
set of contingencies that facilitate and constrain each phase and provide 
us with »a more detailed account of the conditions of network formations« 
(Ebers, 2002, p. 7). Other studies of longitudinal character »provide 
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evidence that once network relations are established, experience with 
networking, mutual learning, and diversity of ties stimulate the formation 
of further networking relationships« (Ebers, 2002, p. 8). 
As to the governance structure, network theory does not ignore the 
importance of how networks are managed. Classic theory suggests that 
hierarchy and steering are optimal, and they may be the only ways to 
manage a network. Network analysts measure this by the centrality of 
actors in a network, the existence of cliques and clusters. Kenis and 
Provan argue (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9 ff.) that »the successful 
adaptation of a particular form of governance« is due to the key structural 
and relational contingencies as e.g., trust, size, goal consensus and the 
nature of tasks. They identify different basic relationships spanning the 
mentioned contingency factors and according to them: The greater the 
inconsistency between critical contingency factors and a particular 
governance form (both in terms of the number of inconsistent factors and 
the extent to which these factors are inconsistent with characteristics of the 
form of governance), the less likely that particular form will be effective. 
This, in turn, will lead either to overall network ineffectiveness, dissolution, 
or changing the form of governance. This is the case because there is a 
dilemma involving trust and governance in which too much 
governance/steering can be costly, but too little can be just as costly 
because of inadequate formal safeguards in reducing opportunistic 
behavior. Those responsible often opt for steering in an effort to minimize 
the second failure without realizing the costs involved with such steering. 
As to the structural features of networks, Krackhardt (1994) argued that by 
increasing network connectedness and achieving unity at higher levels of 
network density, hierarchy can be replaced. Hence, if the density and 
connectivity of a network increases, this in itself, could establish shared 
direction and purpose to the network as a whole. Trust can also substitute 
for formal governance (Lincoln & Gerlach, 2004). The density of a 
network (number of actual ties given the potential number of ties in a 
network) as well as trust would serve as condition for information 
exchange, know-how, best-practices, innovativeness and technological 
performance (Tang & Xi, 2006; Meagher & Rogers, 2004). Furthermore, 
relational features can increase trust, especially when the ties are multiplex 
i.e., structurally diverse (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) and simultaneously 
involve different aspects such as social bonds, business relations, 
normative expectations and roles, and affective aspects (Granovetter, 
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1985). When only narrow channels between organizations exist, this 
might result in limited information exchange (Kenis & Knoke, 2002) and 
e.g., trust decreases transaction costs (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Foster 
Fishman et al., (Foster Fishman, 2001, p. 903) suggest that establishing 
multi-level alliances in multiple contexts and at multiple levels may be a 
promising venue for facilitating inter-organizational exchanges but even 
under optimal circumstances, agents can react very differently to the 
emerging network (Vincent, 2008). Alliances still can have difficulty 
recruiting critical stakeholders, maintaining active member involvement, 
promoting a collaborative work culture, and achieving collaborative 
outcomes (Foster Fishman et al., 2001, p. 901). 
4.2 Lessons from network theory 
Network theory posits that in order to build an organization/network in 
which values and norms are internalized by its employees, the following 
are necessary: 
1. Creating and developing networks of actors is an advantageous 
alternative to both hierarchical steering and market-like individual 
self-steering. Networks can do without hierarchy by increasing the 
connectedness within the network and achieving unity at higher 
levels of network density 
2. Investing in network relations should be a primary activity. This 
investment includes considering task definition, partners’ routines, 
the structure of the organizational interface, and actors’ 
expectations. This investment is especially important in adverse 
contexts. 
3. Recognizing the self-reinforcing effect of investments in network 
relations. Once network relations are established, experience with 
networking, mutual learning, and diversity of ties stimulate the 
formation of further networking relationships. 
4. Optimizing the structural features within networks such as density, 
connectivity and multiplexity. 
5 Conclusions and reflections 
This article argued that present-day procedures on public accountability 
miss the essence of being accountable. We address the point that the 
periodic, formal, routine-based accountability procedures that 
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demonstrate that one’s actions are permissible according to laws and 
regulations, come at the expense of being and feeling responsible for 
one’s actions. We suggested that responsible accountability implies 
affective public service motivation, instead of rational and norm-based 
motivation. This requires actors to know how to deal with, handle and 
manage emotions; it can be propagated by proper socialization when 
individuals enter the organization; and it can be maintained by dense, 
multiplex interpersonal relations that involve more than just rational 
technical goal-oriented interactions. 
This argument differs from those normally found in the literature because 
it provides an alternative to using the role of leadership and procedural 
coordination as driving forces. 
The arguments found in social psychology and network theory point to the 
decisive role of peers or experienced organization members. In this view, 
it is not the role of leadership but the role of middle management that is 
crucial. 
From social psychology, we can deduce that it is mainly middle 
management that guides new professionals through the socialization 
process. The values, norms, attitudes, and the perception of 
professionalism that these middle managers transfer to newcomers is 
crucially important. Social psychological theory tells us that this 
socialization of newcomers should take place when they first enter the 
organization. During these months, and perhaps even the first, year, 
middle managers can shape the newcomers’ attitudes. Therefore, clear 
guidance that transfers the right values and professional attitude is 
indispensable. 
According to network theory, these values can be maintained by 
governance structures that build trust among actors, by individuals or 
organizations, and by dense networks, interlocking relations, information-
exchange, connectivity and especially multiplexity. 
This method is called soft steering, not because we assume that group 
pressure is less persuasive than hierarchical orders, but because it is 
intended to propagate the affective dimension of such motivation as 
opposed to the rational or norm based dimensions of public service 
motivation. As such, it poses an alternative to hierarchy, punishment and 
rewards by economic incentives, and norm-based behavior by extensive 
laws and regulations. 
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We could have posed another question, namely, whether public 
accountability should be abandoned entirely based on the criticism it 
faces, i.e. it is costly, useless, ineffective, biased, immoral. We think that 
would be premature. The classic goals of accountability justify its 
prominence in public administration, and the criticisms are not directed at 
accountability as such, but at the types of implementation of 
accountability that bring the negative side-effects to the fore. 
Whether soft steering is effective remains to be seen, and much more 
empirical research is required. While socialization theories and network 
theories have both received substantial criticism, they are useful for our 
purposes since they provide an appealing answer to our research question 
of how to make public accountability work in such a way that it enhances 
responsibility among the stakeholders. These theories imply that public 
accountability works best when people do what they are expected to do 
because they are committed to their work, they care about the welfare of 
the client, and they are committed to the importance of the program, 
coaching, guiding and comforting clients. 
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POVZETEK 
JAVNA ODGOVORNOST S POMOČJO 
MEHKEGA KRMILJENJA 
Ključne besede: odgovornost, socializacija, teorija mrež, zmanjšanje 
administrativnih stroškov, socialna psihologija 
Ta članek predstavlja stališče, da današnji postopki v zvezi z javno 
odgovornostjo niso v skladni s samim bistvom odgovornosti, in predlaga 
alternative, ki jih ponujata teorija socialne psihologije in teorija mrež. 
Članek na začetku ugotavlja, da redni, formalni, rutinski postopki 
uveljavljanja odgovornosti, ki sporočajo, da so posameznikova dejanja 
dopustna glede na zakone in predpise, slabijo občutek odgovornosti za 
lastna dejanja. Takšno odgovornost, ki temelji na nadzoru in hierarhiji, 
pogosto spremljajo ogromni stroški upravljanja, hkrati pa ima majhno 
praktično uporabnost, saj je takšen sistem odgovornosti pogosto 
pristranski, nima zadostnih kazalcev odgovornosti, če gre kaj narobe, in 
slabi tako imenovano motivacijo javnega sektorja. 
Alternativa je zavzeta odgovornost, kar pomeni čustveno motivacijo 
javnega sektorja namesto racionalne motivacije na podlagi norm. Ta od 
akterjev zahteva, da se znajo soočati s čustvi, jih obravnavati in 
obvladovati; lahko se širi s primerno socializacijo ob posameznikovem 
vstopu v organizacijo in vzdržuje prek tesno povezanih, mnogoplastnih 
medosebnih odnosov, ki obsegajo več kot le racionalno, tehnično in 
ciljno usmerjeno sodelovanje. 
Odgovor na vprašanje, kako to doseči, ponujata teoriji socialne psihologije 
in mrež. 
Teorija socialne psihologija izpostavlja, da zgolj finančno nagrajevanje za 
vedenje, ki ga zaposleni dejansko izvaja, samo povečuje kognitivno 
neusklajenost in s tem brezbrižnost oziroma stres. Ta teorija tudi pravi, da 
ima socializacija – posebno s strani izkušenih članov organizacije/sodelavcev 
– lahko določene prednosti. Posledice takšne socializacije so jasnost in 
skladnost vzajemnih pričakovanj delodajalca in delavca ter celo pojav, ki 
se v socialni psihologiji imenuje psihološka pogodba, tj. jasno zavedanje 
delavca, kakšna dejanja se pričakujejo od njega in kakšen odziv lahko v 
zameno pričakuje od delodajalca. 
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Argyris (1960) je prvi uporabil termin psihološka pogodba in ga opredelil 
kot nenapisan dogovor med skupino zaposlenih in njihovim nadrejenim. 
"Psihološko delovno pogodbo" je orisal prav na način, ki ga iščemo, in 
sicer »bo delavec ohranjal visoko storilnost« ter zmanjšal nadzor in 
kontrolo, medtem ko »delovodja jamči in spoštuje norme neformalne 
kulture zaposlenih«, tako da mu omogoča opraviti določeno nalogo, mu 
zagotavlja primerno plačilo in varno zaposlitev. Socialna psihologija prav 
tako trdi, da mora do te socializacije novincev priti ob vstopu v 
organizacijo. V prvih nekaj mesecih, morda celo v prvem letu, lahko 
srednji vodstveni delavci oblikujejo odnos novincev. Jasno usmerjanje, ki 
posreduje prave vrednote in strokoven odnos, je nujno potrebno. 
Prav tako je treba novince izpostavljati situacijam, v katerih bo zagotovo 
prišlo do kognitivnega neravnovesja, nezdružljivosti ali neusklajenosti, in 
jih izuriti, da prilagodijo, okrepijo ali pretehtajo svoje zaznavanje v skladu 
strokovnimi vrednotami in ob tem razumeti, da je odločilna vloga 
srednjega vodstva veliko bolj ključna kot vloga vodstva. Srednji vodstveni 
delavci morajo nove delavce/nove strokovnjake usmerjati in na novince 
prenesti odnos in vrednote, ki so za organizacijo velikega pomena, ter si 
prizadevati za nenapisan vzajemen dogovor o pričakovanjih – psihološko 
pogodbo – ki ni samo transakcijska pogodba o plačilu za delo ali 
individualizirana pogodba o zaposlitvi, temveč rezultat obsežnega procesa 
socializacije, ki vključuje proces učenja in prilagajanja zaznavanja, kar 
ustvarja vzajemno in očitno upravičeno zaupanje, nadzor pa se lahko 
temu ustrezno zmanjša. Literatura o socialni psihologiji prav tako kaže, da 
je zdržnost pridobljenega znanja, veščin in usvojenih vrednot odvisna od 
taktike, ki je bila uporabljena med socializacijo. 
Odgovor na vprašanje, kako zagotoviti zdržnost vrednot, priučenih s 
socializacijo, ponuja teorija mrež. Po teoriji mrež te vrednote lahko 
ohranjamo s strukturami upravljanja, ki gradijo zaupanje med akterji s 
pomočjo posameznikov ali organizacij ter s pomočjo gostih mrež, 
prepletenih medsebojnih odnosov, izmenjave informacij, povezanosti in še 
posebej večplastnosti. Teorija mrež uči, da je oblikovanje in razvijanje 
mrež akterjev ugodnejša rešitev kot hierarhično krmiljenje in tržnemu 
podobno individualno samokrmiljenje. Mreže se lahko odpovejo hierarhij, 
tako da krepijo povezanost znotraj mreže in dosegajo enotnost z višjo 
stopnjo gostote mreže. Zato bi moralo biti vlaganje v mrežne odnose 
prvenstvena dejavnost. Takšno vlaganje zajema razmislek o definiciji 
nalog, postopkih partnerjev, strukturi presečišča organizacije in 
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pričakovanjih akterjev. To vlaganje je posebno pomembno v neugodnih 
okoliščinah. 
Ta metoda se imenuje mehko krmiljenje, pa ne zato, ker bi domnevali, da 
je skupinski pritisk manj prepričljiv kot hierarhične ureditve, temveč zato, 
ker je namenjeno širjenju čustvene razsežnosti tovrstne motivacije v 
nasprotju z racionalni razsežnostmi motivacije javnega sektorja na podlagi 
norm. Kot takšna predstavlja alternativo hierarhiji, kaznovanju in 
nagrajevanju z ekonomskimi spodbudami ter na normah temelječem 
vedenju zaradi obširnih zakonov in predpisov. 
Ali je mehko krmiljenje učinkovito, se bo še pokazalo in treba bo opraviti 
še veliko več empiričnih raziskav. Teorije o socializaciji in mrežah 
ponujajo privlačen odgovor na naše raziskovalno vprašanje, kako 
poskrbeti, da bo javna odgovornost delovala na način, ki krepi 
odgovornost med deležniki. Iz teh teorij izhaja, da javna odgovornost 
najbolje deluje, kadar ljudje delajo, kar se od njih pričakuje, zato, ker so 
predani svojemu delu, jim ni vseeno za dobrobit stranke in so predani 
pomenu programa ter stranke poučujejo, usmerjajo in z njimi 
sočustvujejo. 
 
 
